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What Kind of Law Making in a Global World?
The Case of Africa
Jacques Vanderlinden*
I. INTRODUCTION

When I was considering the main topic assigned by the
organizers of the symposium, i.e., law making in a global world, a
preliminary question jumped to mind: How relevant is the
reference to a global world-is it just a gratuitous reference to an
intellectual fashion of the day? Literally speaking the adjective
"global" refers to something that "embraces the totality of a group
of items."' But, on the one hand, since, in this instance, it qualifies
the world (isn't global coming from globe and, accordingly, this
juxtaposition tautological?), it may leave us a bit perplexed about
the exact nature and extent of the items embraced. Are we really
concerned about the law making of a global law applicable to the
whole planet? On the other hand, when I look superficially at what
appears to me and around me today when one refers to the global
world, I tend, although for different reasons, to see myself as
lonely as the savage in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.
Yet one thing seems obvious to me: The organizers of this
symposium never pretended that they would limit themselves to
law making with the purpose of embracing a universal regulation
of some legal field or another. Quite on the contrary, the
organizers left the participants free to tackle different subjects that
reflected the participants' own interests and left the difficulty of
opening and concluding remarks to Professor Mordteau. Being
reassured on the discretion the participants possessed in choosing
their topics, I chose to abandon the original draft of my article that
merely reflected my perplexity and lack of inspiration during the
weeks preceding the symposium.
My perplexity resulted from the uneasiness I felt with the idea
that we had to govern our thinking along the lines of law making in
a global way, a view some lawyers believed (and some still do)
fifty years ago when Louis B. Sohn and Grenville Clark published
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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their World Peace Through World Law. 3 Having personally
known Professor Sohn and having had the privilege of hosting him
in a conference I organized, I can only wonder today how it was
possible for a scholar of such magnitude and experience to
seriously defend such an idea. If Louis B. Sohn, from wherever he
is today, is unfortunate enough to see the world he dreamt of half a
century ago, he would see only that war rather than peace
embraces far too many countries of the world.
This is especially true of the continent where I was born and
where I have spent roughly a third of my life: Africa. It is a
continent where legal globalization has apparently only brought
havoc. But the case of Africa provides a good illustration of the
catastrophic impact globalization may have on wide segments of
the world's population. The main one, in the socio-economic field,
is pauperization-a topic on which Professor Banakas has so
eloquently spoken and written during this symposium. When
compared with the impact of economic globalization, legal
globalization may seem negligible. Yet I thought what had
happened for a century or so and is still happening in Africa could
perhaps have global value and teach the apprentice sorcerers a
lesson if they are ever inclined to be taught anything.
Globalization is an ongoing process that has been underway for
years, decades, centuries, and possibly even millenaries. Didn't
the Romans once believe they were ruling the universe of their
time? Yet they were careful not to think of their law as global. At
the threshold of the so-called modem times (not those of Charles
Chaplin), didn't Austria consider its destiny "to command the
universal orb" (Austria Est Imperare Orbem Universum)? Yet
Charles V never contemplated legislating for his whole empire.
And, in the nineteenth century, wasn't Britannia ruling the waves,
i.e., seventy percent of the Earth and some pieces of land too? Yet
Victoria, Regina Imperatrix, ruled the empire through many
municipal laws that only had to reflect, as near as may be possible,
those of Great Britain or, in most cases, England. All these claims
were part of common political bragging and one may wonder
whether or not this is still the case today when media tycoons
claim that billions can see "as if they were there" (and even better)
the World Cup soccer finals or the Olympic Games, not to mention
Malibu or General Hospital. One thing seems sure: They
encourage sociologists to declare that media rules the world.
This claim, again, is arguable. Isn't the control of media only
one aspect of financial globalization and one of the most powerful
3. Grenville Clark & Louis B. Sohn, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD
LAW (1958).
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tools in the hands of those who advocate it? This crude fact may
lead some among us to deny nearly any role to law in the shaping
of human destiny, to lose interest in the development of our
discipline, and to seek refuge in the fascinating technicalities and
mechanisms that highly developed laws offer. The opposite
view-held by Professor Banakas, myself, and many others-finds
that in order to reduce the impact of financial globalization on the
current lives of so many people, we must plead for the joining of
resources of all those who believe that justice is a dominant value
implied in anything legal.
This being said and admitting that every embrace of the totality
of a group of items-in my case, those coming under the three
letters of the word "law"--is highly relative,. I would like to
consider the production of law as a global phenomenon from the
world-level down to that of the State. In a way and in its positivist
approach, the law globalizes when it tends to embrace the whole
field of law making.
But, assuming it is feasible consensus-wise, is a global
approach to law (1) an irrepressible necessity and (2) not
conducive to losses far outweighing its benefits?
Considering first the necessity question, I am puzzled by an
apparently contradictory movement that dates back roughly (please
let us not quarrel about dates) to the last quarter of the twentieth
century, i.e., the one that, in Europe, is characterized by a
widespread movement towards decentralization, regionalism,
autonomy, and federalism. No wonder the Swiss were so
interested in this movement-their confederate system certainly
represented and still represents the paradigm of this movement.
Accordingly, they launched some twenty years afo a EURORdgions summer university,4 which still runs today. The project
was strongly supported by the Council of Europe,6 which was
heavily committed to the regional, cultural, economic, political,
and social identities within the limits of Europe. This is certainly
not a reflection of any unanimity as to the absolute necessity of
globalization since the focus is only in the European field. On the
contrary, the idea behind the program was to foster the Council's
initiative to develop highly specific, trans-border, interstate, and
regional cooperation. Of course the Council does not have the
4. See Institute of Federalism, http://www.federalism.ch/ (last visited Mar.
21, 2007).
5. I was one of its founding members and am still one of its two honorary
members.
6. See generally Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/ (last visited Mar.
21, 2007).
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means possessed by the former European Community or the
present Union, and its action is far less renowned than that of the
latter.
Parallel to these institutional aspects, it seems that in some
countries there has emerged, in the course of the last fifteen years
or so, 7 a desire of the people to play a greater role in the making of
the law that governs their daily lives. Although law making can
still, in many places, be controlled by the courts, this tendency-of
which a most apparent manifestation comes under the general idea
of "mediation" (replacing that of adjudication)-reflects an
increased will of individuals to take an active part in the settlement
of their possible social conflicts and in the making of their own
law. It also contributes to a pluralist approach to law and society
and the will to take into consideration the legitimate expectations
exercised by concerned individuals. 8 It ultimately leads to critical
or radical legal pluralism in which law can be-independently
from the multiple other forms it may take, including State lawwhat every individual thinks it to be. How are such movements in
tune with the paradigmatic vocation of thinking that law must be
conceived in a global way? Or are these movements signs of a real
reaction against the excesses of the "classical" views according to
which there is either only one law, that of the State (or-why
not?-a truly "global" law, serving their interests), or only
institutional or contractual law makers operating side-by-side with
the State? This is not the place to discuss this problem to which
Professor Macdonald, one of the symposium participants, has
devoted many of his recent seminal contributions.
Turning now to the point of establishing an adequate balance
between benefits and losses for the populations concerned, the
questions are fairly simple. Has the existing legal framework to
align itself with the indifference towards the unbearable misery
prevailing on some continents and with the increasing inequalities
that are slowly but constantly growing in Western Europe or
northern North America? Has it to be satisfied with the quite
unsatisfactory condition of an increasingly sizeable part of the
populations of some countries? Unfortunately, these frightful
numbers tend more and more to be considered as statistical data
without any human significance. One is led to believe, as in the
7. See J.-P. Bonafd-Schmitt, MEDIATION ET REGULATION SOCIALE:
See
APPROCHE COMPARATIVE FRANCE-USA--GRANDE-BRETAGNE (1992).
also SOURCES ET INSTRUMENTS DE JUSTICE EN DROIT PRIVE 141 (N. Kasirer &
P. Noreau eds., 2002).
8. See Carole Younes & Etienne Roy Le Roy, MEDIATION ET DIVERSITE
CULTURELLE: POUR QUELLE SOCIETE? (2002).
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colonial period, that other parts of the world must go through all
the evils and sufferings experienced in Europe or northern North
America if these other parts of the world are to reach the same
level of material development as Europe and northern North
America. Such is "the nature of things" in a perverted use of
history. An obvious or insidious growing of social or human
underdevelopment ultimately seems to be the only convincing
result of economic globalization-necessarily expressed through
one-way trade statistics, the suppression of local economies, the
size of container-carrying ships, and the growing number of
billionaires-and as the only way of raising the average per capita
income of millions of people. Is it that which the makers of
tomorrow's law wish to passively reflect? And is it on such
cultural, economic, political, and social havoc that they will
contribute as lawyers to a more globally just world?
Had it not been for Professor Banakas's firm and articulated
stand, I would have been willing to admit that I was just a relic of a
distant past when led to believe that law should also mean and
foster, even in a minimal way, social justice. Thank you, Professor
Banakas, for having allowed me a respite.
II.

THE CASE OF LEGAL GLOBALIZATION IN AFRICA

For more than a century, Africans (after all isn't it they,
individually and socially, who have borne the brunt of the impact
of globalization?) have been subjected to the global influence of
various concepts that the European (and later the North American)
9
nations have unilaterally decided to give universal value.
A. The Continent as a Whole
First, there is an elementary idea among lawyers that Africa is
a whole without any distinction, except for the distinctive physical
traits of its people, i.e., the color of the skin. There was
accordingly a "black" Africa, which geographically covered part of
the continent and spread from the southern limit of the Sahara
Desert to the Cape of Good Hope. Within these limits, so-called
"black" Africa would know of only one law, i.e., African law.
This would ignore the huge differences between the laws of either
9. In an approach totally different and, in some places, carrying things
erroneously to extremes by lack of his personal documentation and experience
on huge parts of African scholarship and realities, see W. Menski,
COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT-THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA

AND AFRICA 380 (2006).
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people practicing agriculture, commerce, fishing, gathering,
hunting, and pasturing, or societies having adopted as their mode
of government various forms of political regimes, be they that of
the lineage or that of some kind of pre-State structure.
One presumed that these different forms of economic or sociopolitical organization could function under a single legal system.
But this globalization with reference to the laws of a continent
obliterated the specific identities of the cultures concerned under a
color of the skin. The latter, in turn, sent back, knowingly or not,
to the malediction of Chain as it appears in the founding myths of
the Judeo-Christian tradition, which subsumes the current laws of
Europe or of European origin throughout the world. As a result
African law necessarily belonged to an even wider and more
globalizing category, that of "primitive" law, which was widely
accepted until the mid 1950s.10 For many, Iit meant that Africa at
large still had a long way to go in order to get "civilized"--from
the age of stone to that of the atom.
The concept of "civilization" is the second globalizing concept
that was imposed upon African cultures and laws. In order to
become "civilized," Africans and their laws had to give up all
mechanisms linked to the prevalence of social harmony for the
benefit of the adjudicatory legal process favored in Europe. In
many if not most African societies where there is reliable
information available on this topic,12 what is considered by
American and European legal systems as a criminal offense is in
African laws a strictly private matter that can be solved through
various mechanisms ranging from apologies to compensation of
some kind or another. Society as such does not appear in the
process through any kind of prosecuting or punishing device. It
only intervenes for what is considered a real offense to social
order, such as offenses against socio-political authorities, evil
witchcraft, and recidivism to the extent it becomes a social
nuisance. Thus what Americans and Europeans would consider
justification for authorities to intervene, e.g., accidental wounding
or even the killing of a person, remains a strictly private affair in
Africa. The focus in Africa is on the conduct of a member of
society that disturbs another member and possibly endangers the
necessary harmony that society needs to survive. In such a

10. See the remarkable book of an exceptional legal anthropologist, E.
Adamson Hoebel, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954).
11. But not for Hoebel in his book quoted in the previous note.
12. This is an important caveat as many aspects of African legal systems are
still better unknown than known.
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situation, what is important is the injured party's acceptance of this
conduct and the subsequent reestablishment of harmony.
The case decided before the court of Gikongoro in postcolonial Rwanda clearly illustrates this dilemma.' 3 A boy and a
girl spent the evening at a dance. Both were a bit tipsy and at the
end of the party the boy asked the girl to sleep at his place and
offered her money to do so. She refused, but he insisted. They
began to push one another, and, suddenly, under a push, she fell
badly from her chair and died instantaneously. The boy was
criminally indicted for having caused her unintentional death, and
the public prosecutor was required to punish him in accordance
with the Penal Code. As the time for pleadings came, the fathers
of both youths explained to the court that what had happened was a
most unfortunate event in which no one has any real responsibility.
They said that sending the boy to prison would help no one,
especially the girl's family who had been fully compensated
according to custom and held no grudge whatsoever against the
boy and his family. They accordingly asked for an acquittal of the
boy. The answer of the court was terse. According to the
(imported) Code of Criminal Procedure, the parties could not take
legal action once an indictment was decided. The facts were clear
and the boy had to incur punishment for his actions. Thus the
court sentenced him to a suspended detention in jail and a heavy
fine.
Reading this case, I cannot help wondering where the
"civilized" law lies. This is just one among innumerable cases in
which an imported, exogenous, "civilized" system wipes out a
fundamental characteristic of an endogenous and truly African
legal system. What is more surprising is that elimination of the
primacy of social harmony comes at a time where, in Europe, we
rediscover the virtues of mediation and solutions to litigation built
by the parties themselves.
This brings me to one of the elements underlying the will to
restore the seamless web of societies, which has been greatly
modified by the intrusion of outside worlds. This element is the
full understanding by the parties concerned of the reasons for a
disturbance of peace and the commission of a delictual or criminal
act that harms a fellow member of society. The assumption is that
if one fully realizes why the natural state of peace, which society
needs to survive, has been disturbed, one will be able, through
education, to avoid similar incidents in the future. This is a
lengthy and global (at the level of society) process that takes time
and involves everyone in the community. The process will
13.

11 REVUE JURIDIQUE DU RWANDA

535

(1987).
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necessarily end when the wrongful party acknowledges the nature
of his act by compensating (possibly symbolic, but more often
quite valuable) the victim and restoring the normal web of social
relations in the society concerned. This essential element is
reflected in the name given in South Africa to the commission
entrusted with the task of restoring harmony after the terrible
apartheid period: truth-as all parties have to fully understand the
reasons why it could happen-and reconciliation-as all South
Africans have to live together and build a new harmonious South
African society.
This may seem idyllic, but it does not mean that pre-colonial
societies were without punishment. Quite on the contrary,
punishment existed (and still exists) and was (or is) often harsh.
But it was applied only to cases in which (1) the tearing of the
seamless web was such that it amounted to an offense, i.e., so
grave that society had to intervene because the restoration of
harmony was not achievable by the common will of the parties or
(2) the repeated tearing of the web proved to be an incapacity of
the person who caused it to change his conduct, thus endangering
social life in a serious manner. As Hoebel clearly shows through
examples,14 law had teeth and those teeth could bite. One could
also argue that such a way of considering the legal process is
impossible because of the conditions of "modem" life. Yet the
example of the above-mentioned case in Gikongoro (and many
others I could mention) proves the contrary. The technique is also
used in the worst possible conditions, i.e., in modem cities of
North America, such as Toronto where it is applied to delinquent,
uprooted, aboriginal youth with considerable success. It has been
shown that such procedures lead to a highly favorable percentage
of non-recidivism (up to eighty percent), while the usual criminal
procedure and its usual punishment end up with seventy percent of
recidivism. 15
The relevance of the above considerations to the topic of
globalization becomes clearer upon examination of the developing
work of the International Criminal Court in The Hague and, in
particular, the first cases that addressed situations arising in Africa.
A personal contact with the judges of the court and its ancillary
personnel-especially those of African origin who had had an
opportunity to approach victims or witnesses of serious crimesled to the confirmation of a personal conviction: the latter would
not be satisfied with sentencing the culprits to jail term in a foreign
14.
15.

Hoebel, supra note 10.
See Craig Proulx, RECLAIMING

COMMUNITY (2003).

ABORIGINAL JUSTICE, IDENTITY AND
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country however long it may be. Of essential importance in their
eyes would be not only understanding why these people behaved in
a most horrible way-understanding would, in a way, be to know
the complete truth about the unbelievable-but also coming to
peace with their shattered ideas about harmony in society and
reconciling this knowledge with a part of their self: their
conception of social life. Without satisfying that requirement of
the victims, the decisions of the International Court would satisfy
the exogenous public opinion but would be totally foreign to the
victims; accordingly, "truth and reconciliation" would never be
possible. Also notice that there is, in such processes, no mention
of either fault or pardon; these are imported exogenous concepts
closely linked to the founding myths of Christianity. These
concepts were brought into Africa by missionaries, but conversions
did not necessarily entail the disappearance of deep-rooted values,
which for Africans goes back-as they do for Europeans or North
Americans-to the founding myths of their civilizations.
This kind of "global" outlook at the laws of Africa (and most
of the rest of the world even if it was difficult to call it uncivilized
when one thought for a minute about what, for example, Asia,
from Mecca to Kyoto, brought to civilization) seems to be a
permanent feature of European and North American lawyers when,
in the early 1900s, they were propagating the credo of civilization
to the so-called "savage" or "primitive" populations of Africa,
America, or Asia, wherever those populations had come under
their domination. At the beginning of the second half of the
16
century, with the accession of many colonies to independence,
the fertile mind of former colonial lawyers invented the most
useful substitute for "legal development" 7 in order to carry out
their role as mental colonizers in neo-colonial legal systems. This
substitute I first encountered in Kinshasa in the early sixties when,
as Secretary General of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, I
was closely associated with the successive attempts to prepare an
Investment Code for the Congo. Which African country has not
had its successive investment codes during the times that followed
independence? And in which country did any of these codes bring
true economic development, as opposed to an increased servitude
to capital?
Contrary to some of my colleagues, I did not believe in legal
engineering as a panacea for the development of harmonious
16. Absent from the process were the Asiatic non-colonies of Russia.
17. When I was seconded to Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa in
the mid-1960s, one of my tasks was to establish there a centre for African legal
development.
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societies, especially when the law came from (1) the outside world
and from (2) the top down to the people concerned. Such belief is
founded on a good dose of empirical observation of what happened
around Africa during the last half-century. Total failure and even
an aggravation of existing situations have been and still are the
results of the import of exogenous concepts considered as "global"
concepts. Needless to say, such experiences contributed heavily to
the development of my pluralist conception of law.
From the point of view of this symposium, the developmental
approach of former colonial laws was more "global."
This
approach exceeded the Belgian, British, French, Portuguese, or
Spanish conceptions of where those people, who were subjected to
the colonial laws, were supposed to go. The failure of the
developmental legal theories was parallel to the growing
underdevelopment of the countries involved. But lawyers who are
determined (in French, one would say stainless) in their conviction
may prove that they hold the key to progress and wisdom. Hence
there is the present tendency to impose in a subtle but forceful way
values, such as democracy, structural adjustment, good
governance, and accountability, as a condition for outside
international support and any "assistance" that could be provided
to countries in crisis. Do lawyers supporting that global view of
international decency ever look at the situation in their own
countries and at the way their governments treat some of their own
fellow citizens or respect the rule of law?
Of course paying some kind of lip service to these prevalent
"global" doctrines can be fruitful in many ways. The funding for
persons or institutions often cannot be dissociated from an
adhesion to such doctrines when one is interested in international
cooperation. When confronted with the dilemma, it is up to each
individual conscience to make a choice that-we all know--can be
a very difficult one.
Finally, the importation of exogenous concepts of law and the
molding of young local lawyers on the model of their civil or
common law counterparts have produced a generation of women
and men completely divorced from their fellow countrymen and
countrywomen. The latter distrust and reject the kind of justice
that mimics what its servants have been led to believe must be the
universal look of the law. They appear as a predating class, closely
associated with colonization and neo-colonization, propagating in
the universities and administering, in and around the courts, a law
on the books that is part of the global law some experts dream of in
international organizations' offices. As a result, they are more and
more rejected by the populations as "foreigners." As one of the
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best British experts on Ghana writes with a traditional academic
restraint in his language:
[I]t is to be expected that the legal profession will exist as a
socially distinct category somewhat alienated from other
sections of society. There is, moreover, much evidence that
lawyers, even when respected for their wealth and power,
have also long been regarded with hostility for their
professional practices.'
And, in that case, when a "populist" revolution happened in
Ghana in the early 1980s, many lawyers were practically forced
into exile due to a reaction against them much stronger than simple
disaffection.
Looking at the resulting collapse of State justice in many
places, one should not believe that Africa has turned lawless.
Quite on the contrary, it offers in the countryside or towns many
remarkable examples of legal pluralism. People organize, at
various levels, a diversity of systems the function of which is to
satisfy their need for justice. All sorts of existing social bonds,
whether administrative, familial, local, professional, religious, or
traditional-just to mention a few-are capable of replacing a
failing State administration of justice.19 As for the law applied, it
is clear that it may be infinitely diverse and of all origins. Its
essential feature is that it represents an acceptable rule for the
judicial game to be played in the mind of all participants in order
for a common feeling of justice to be satisfied. What the people
are calling "laws" truly are laws.
Complementary to these spontaneous mechanisms, some
welcome initiatives tend to restore a dialogue between the
estranged "elites" and the common folks. This is the case for a
project organized by the Afrika-Studiecentrum and two other
research centers in the Netherlands, all parts of the University of
Leiden.
The project was initiated and directed by Dr. G.
Hesseling, a legal anthropologist of great reputation, in conjunction
with the two faculties of the University of Bamako (Mali), that of
Arts and of Law. Seven Malian teachers of law were selected for
the project and, after a basic training in anthropology, they were
sent for a period of anywhere from six weeks to four months to do
fieldwork in rural administrations or areas. There they studied
18. G. Woodman, KNOWLEDGE OF STATE LAW IN GHANA: ASPECTS OF A
THIRD WORLD SOCIAL ORDERING (1984).
19. See Marie-Claire Foblets & Filip Reyntjens, Champs normatifs urbains
en Afrique contemporaine (Urban Normative Fields in Africa Today), 42 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 5 (1998) (examples from Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe).
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problems that fell within the scope of their courses. For most of
them, the experience was shattering as these quotations, among
many others, reveal: "There is no question of living without the
State, but of ...reconciling the citizen with the State"; 20 "the rule
of law cannot materialize itself if it is not rooted in a law which is
understood and accepted by all actors"; 2' "the initiation [he has
undergone] has provoked a tearing from what you have done until
then and the integration of a new entity of which you will have
now to carry the values"; 22 his legal education and the one he has
contributed to spread a "caricature-like, incomplete and even
dogmatic vision of the law." 23 Each of the experiences described
in the book are worth studying. They represent the beginning of
the decolonization of young African lawyers, who were pushed far
away from any globalizing temptation they could have had until
then on the basis of their exogenous legal education.
What I have mentioned until now is mutatis mutandis, valid for
the continent. But globalization, lato sensu, can also happen at the
level of the State. Following up on what I have mentioned about
African diversity, such diversity can indeed exist within the limits
of a region or even within one single State as soon as a country has
an average size in comparison to the rest of the continent. I will
limit myself with one example, that of Ethiopia.
B. The State as a Whole
As the 1960s were nearing, Haile Selassie (the Power of the
Trinity), the last Ethiopian emperor, decided that his country had to
be a model in the context of the exogenous "development"
doctrine, which was soon to engulf most African countries in the
post-colonial era. In the field of law, the symbol of such
"progress"--as he was told by his French advisers-could be none
other than codification. Thus an ambitious project was launched
that aimed at globalizing the various components of the museum of
Ethiopian populations by providing it with six "national" codes:
civil, commercial, criminal, maritime, plus civil and criminal
procedure.24 The drafting of each of them was entrusted to an
expert: Professor David, the famous specialist of comparative law
20.

Gerti Hesseling et al., LE DROIT EN AFRIQUE-EXPERIENCES LOCALES

ET DROIT ETATIQUE AU MALI 69 (2005).

21. Id.at 71.
22. Id. at 75.
23. Id. at 153.
24. An introduction to the Ethiopian codification is provided in Jacques
Vanderlinden, Civil Law and Common Law Influences on the Developing Law of
Ethiopia, 16 BUFF. L. REv. 250 (1968).
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from Paris University. He became the "father" of the Ethiopian
Civil Code. In a country that had rightly been called a museum of
populations by a respected Italian social anthropologist, this was
indeed a globalizing venture. All existing sources of law were
declared ineffective when the Code came into force in 1960. The
role of custom, which was the prevalent source of law for most
populations of the "museum," was reduced to a strict minimum in
cases where the Code expressly provided for its application, but
even mentioning these few official outlets entailed the risk of being
accused of "turning the legal clock back" on the road to modernity
and development.
Needless to say the Code quickly became one of these many
statutory instruments that were adopted in Africa following the
recommendations of self-qualified experts trying to emulate David
in his preparation of "precise and detailed rules" reflecting, as the
emperor said in his preface to the Code, "the best legal systems in
the world. 25 Hence the production of a patchwork of various legal
provisions borrowed portions of the Egyptian, French, Greek,
Israeli, Italian, Portuguese, Russian, Swiss, Turk (from the times of
the Turkish Empire), or Yugoslav codes or laws, and, last but not
least, the common law with the trust! These were totally foreign to
the Ethiopian context and rendered extremely difficult, if not
impossible, any reference by the users to the rationale of the
adoption of one or the other set of provisions by the drafter.
Furthermore, it was still sometimes difficult to reconcile the spirit
in which some provisions operate, e.g., in the field of contracts
where the overall setting is Swiss, but some specific provisions,
e.g., on consent, are French. Finally, some provisions were so
foreign to Ethiopian mentality that ministers and judges alike flatly
declared that they should not be taken into consideration; this was
the case, for example, with the imposition of a family name as a
distinctive sign of identity for every Ethiopian physical person.
The Code also did not avoid the traps of multilingualism.
Drafted in French, the Code had to be translated in English, the
second de facto official language of the country, before a further
translation in the official language of the country, Amharic. 26 In
spite of the lip service paid for a time to the French version, it was
clear that the Amharic version was the only one upon which to
rely. The problem was that this second degree translation was
abnormally weak, and, in some cases, David did not focus on the
problems that could result from the successive translations of his
25. CIVIL CODE OF THE EMPIRE OF ETHIoPIA OF 1960, at v.
26. Amharic is the mother tongue of twenty-five percent of the population
(the dominating Amhara ethnic group).
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text. An example is the original article 1 of the Code, which reads:
"La personne humaine est sujet de droit de sa naissance Asa mort,"
and becomes in English and then in Amharic: "The human person
is subject of rights from its birth to its death." The French "sujet
de droit" refers to law (i.e., rights as well as obligations) and not to
rights as the English does. In fact the French expression has no
equivalent in English and is foreign as such to the common law.
The practical result was that Ethiopian students and lawyers would
argue that a person had obligations under the Code, while it clearly
said in the official language that it had only rights! This is but a
simple example of the innumerable mistranslations that marred the
text.
27
Finally, the Supreme Court of Ethiopia decided from the start
that some general principles were to prevail no matter how precise
and binding the language of the Code might be. Even though
article 881 provided that a public will "shall be of no effect unless
it is read in the presence of the testator and four witnesses," no
exception being allowed, the Court nevertheless decided that a will
was valid with only three witnesses when the intention of the
testator was clear. Such flexibility considerably reduced the care
of David to deliver a code 28
precise enough to avoid innumerable
controversies based on facts.
These examples illustrate the kind of global law making under
which millions of people have felt estranged from their culture,
decided to resort to laws other than their own, or suffered in the
field of law. These examples also illustrate another point: The
increase of pauperization and the decline in basic cultural abilities
(i.e., reading and writing) occurred not only in most
underdeveloped countries, but also in many developed countries.
The result of this global trend inexorably facilitates the triumph of
capital, as analyzed by Professor Banakas, at the expense of many
people who are concerned by the effect of this situation in their
daily lives. But where do we go from here in terms of law
making? Admitting for a minute-as a postulate-that law should
be the ultimate bulwark against the totalitarianism of capital, to
whom should the task of law making be entrusted and under which
form? Let us consider what each of the law makers' current legal
literature proposes to our attention.

See generally 1 J. ETHIOPIAN L. 26 (1964).
28. This being, for Ethiopia, a typically exogenous monist reasoning where
the law provides one answer and one only to any legal question, that answer
being found in a code leaving no power to the judge to err on the basis of justice.
27.
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III. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES TO GLOBAL LAW MAKING IN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES?

When I prepared the first draft of my article, I did not realize
that my African roots would finally push me into focusing on the
continent where I was born, have spent one-third of my life, and
have spent a considerable amount of time not only learning about
its problems, but also listening to the experiences of young African
lawyers with whom I have conversed. I also did not realize,
though I should have known it as soon as I learned of his
participation in the symposium, that Professor Macdonald would
provide the readers of this Review with one of his imaginative and
seminal texts on a topic we have had in common for some yearslegal pluralism. The following remarks will accordingly (1) focus
on African reality and (2) carefully avoid stepping into Professor
Macdonald's colorful approach, even though, from time to time, I
allude to one or another of his wonderful formulations that are far
more explicit than my clumsy ones.
My position starts with the following postulate: Law is made
for the people and not the people for law. This may seem trite, but
globalization is just the contrary of such postulate. It molds all
people in one uniform legal structure upon the presumption that all
women and men are identical and live in the same cultural,
economic, political, and social environment. If this premise is true,
long live globalization. My anthropological self, however, cannot
accept it. Thus, it appears to me that building an alternative for
law making in Africa must take into consideration what I would
consider to be four fundamental parameters: (1) the considerable
diversity of African societies; (2) the highly socially-oriented
psychology of Africans; (3) the aspiration they share with many
people to know the law to which they are eventually subjected; and
(4) the absolute need for Africa to be a distinct part of the global
world and to use law in order to fight globalization.
A. The Parameterof the ConsiderableDiversity of African
Societies
Unless one adopts from the start the idea that law must be
uniform for all the abstract entities that make up the African
"sujets de droit," African diversity necessarily implies legal
pluralism, whether it is moderate or radical legal pluralism or
possibly a mixture of both. Here, perhaps, a word of clarification
is required for readers of this Review who are not familiar with
pluralist readings of law systems.
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A pluralist view of law requires one to distinguish between law
and laws-between a single global law that "embraces the totality
of a group of items" (in this case, the items may be called "legal
relations") and a plurality of laws. This distinction operates on the
assumption that individuals are the focal point of many laws. In an
attempt to avoid overlap with the contribution of Professor
Macdonald, one of the best known theoreticians and exponents of
the doctrine of legal pluralism, I will say only that if such a
conception of law prevails as to the kind of product we wish to
relate with law making in a global world, it will apparently require
an approach quite different from that adopted by a majority of
those who have dedicated their lives to research and teaching in the
field of law.
The challenge resulting from pluralistic conceptions will
necessarily move them to a field of much greater doubt than the
one they already entertain in the common law world with respect
to the predictability of supreme court decisions. Indeed, when the
members of a supreme court express and argue quite different
points of view as to the solution to adopt or as to the motives for
which to adopt a specific solution, is it not fundamentally a legal
pluralism of some kind? Of course, at the present time, the
pluralistic potential of the situation is annihilated by the majority
rule. But everyone knows that some minority opinions are often
the starting point of a future majority decision. Yet a further step
can still be taken: that advocated by critical legal pluralists, who
suggest that one should potentially consider as law what the people
declare is law in their mind. This is the radical pluralism Professor
Macdonald pleads for and to which I myself subscribe. This
approach reflects the growing desire of many citizens to define
their legal relations in their own words and in accordance with
their own values. By so doing, they move from a status of subjects
to the law to one of law makers. So-called "alternative" ways of
settling conflicts open up a terra incognita,the exploration of
which will be quite difficult for the interested scholar. In fact, the
scholar's potential qualms will be settled by the admission that
these new legal processes as such-as well as their outcomealmost completely escape his field of study and teaching, while
what was until recently considered by him as being "the" law is
now only a part, and possibly a small or very small part of what
happens in the legal life of the population.
History and the present show us that such a conclusion is not
new. On the one hand, in the field of history, colonial situations of
all kinds (Europeans colonizing Africans, Amerindians, Asians, or
their fellow Europeans) have come to realize that the law they
imported as an exogenous law often became but a law on the books
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and not that of the dominated population. The latter rapidly
developed, on a traditional basis or in new ways, legal systems
parallel to the official one that partially or completely escaped
from the officially recognized single legal system in force. Today,
it is sufficient to look at the practice of international commerce and
arbitration and to realize that this is a world of ad hoc solutions
reached by very specific procedures that depend on the will of the
parties. But there is no need to go international. The press is quite
regularly mentioning that parties to litigation "have settled out of
court." In a compromise between parties, the process utilized and
the conditions considered are generally unknown. However, it is
very unlikely that the compromise failed to rely upon the "normal"
basis as stated in ordinary State legal procedures and rules that are
easily found in statutes or court decisions. Thus the laws applied
in most States are already plural. This occurs in many situations
when States take into account the personality of the parties and
shatter the myth of equality in front of the law. In such cases,
States allow what some have called semi-autonomous legal fields
to operate within the limits they define. This is all trite once one
admits a pluralistic conception of law, but it needs to be kept in
mind when contemplating law making.
Beyond that first conception of legal pluralism comes that
which perhaps
most theoreticians advocate nowadays. According
29
to Belley, who is one of the strongest proponents in Canada and
one of several classical authors of the first half of the twentieth
century (Ehrlich, Romano, and Gurvitch are others), legal
pluralism supposes an adjustment between structured legal orders
to which individuals belong whether or not they are State organs or
subsidiaries. This is the case, e.g., for businesses, corporations,
trade unions, churches, and criminal gangs even if very few
contemporary theoreticians of legal pluralism are willing to
consider the case of the mafia in their studies. 30 A big step has
been taken towards extending pluralism in this case since the coexisting fields of law with which individuals are confronted are no
longer necessarily subjected to some kind of State control (the
example of the mafia is particularly interesting on that count). The
adoption of such conception of legal pluralism necessarily asks for
a reassessment of the notion of legal order as it leaves the safe
ground of the positivist, State-referring conception of law.

29.

See Jean-Guyy Belley, LE CONTRAT ENTRE DROIT, ECONOMIE ET

SocIETE (1998).
30. Santi Romano, one of the most advanced writers on legal pluralism in
early 1918, was one theoretician who considered the case of the mafia.
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Yet critical or radical pluralists consider that the everyday
analysis of social relationships goes much further than either
private settlements, which are governed by the more or less
imperial aegis of State authorities (whoever they are), or the
institutional contractual pluralism that Belley advocates. This
view completely reverses the focus of pluralism because it centers
upon the multiple and complex personality of the individual, who
is then considered a genuine law maker. Yet critical or radical
pluralists do not claim any kind of monopoly in the production of
law. They believe, as I do, in a pluralist pluralism. Thus a
pluralist reading of law does not mean that one excludes all
existing sources to the benefit of a single one-stating the only law
to be that stated by the people concerned according to the formula
used by Tamanaha. 3 1 The worst thing for a pluralist when
contesting monism would be to turn himself monist and disclaim
any validity to other conceptions. The pluralist only asks for a
wider look at how law is being made in society. He does not ask
for a monopoly in favor of the perception of law he develops at the
level of individuals, who are seen by him not as pure subjects of a
law made by the State and its organs, but as law makers.
For African countries, I would plead, as I did rather shyly
seven years ago, for an accepted (what I like to call a
consociational) pluralism. This means essentially reaching an
agreement between the various cultural, economic, political, and
social components of societies in order to soften to a maximum the
weight in the kaleidoscope of yellow, cyan, magenta, and black- 32
colors of monism, centralism, positivism, and prescriptivism,
which are the current characteristics of State law. Because the
State is still an unquestionable part of the world's organization,
there is no question that it must be eliminated even though the
world's organization may appear unsatisfactory in many
circumstances. But it is clear that Professor Macdonald's four
colors must, in as many places as possible, be replaced in order to
effectively give way to what people think the law is or should be.
This approach is necessary to satisfy people's expectations.
In that law making activity, the State would use Macdonald's
traditional way of expressing the law: legislation which is green in
Macdonald's prism and in my African kaleidoscope. What seems
important here is the scope the State gives to its role in society. I
would like to risk presenting the idea that, wherever the State's
31. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27
J. L. & Soc'y 296, 313 (2000).
32. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Unitary Law Re-form, PluralisticLaw ReSubstance: IlluminatingLegal Change, 67 LA. L. REv. 1113 (2007).
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intervention is not needed and other law makers exist, the State
should refrain from intervening and abstain from indulging in law
making. This leaves the State wide discretion in its actions but
excludes it from most conflicts, regardless of whether they involve
individuals alone or criminal matters that can be solved through
more traditional ways. These conflicts should not be regulated
from top to bottom or by punishment as prescribed in criminal
legislation. Instead, they should be resolved by those mechanisms
that lead to the re-establishment of social harmony. If the amount
of legislation and the determination to cover every single aspect of
social life increased regularly, then this attitude of the African
State would take a completely different direction than the one
adopted by many States of the world in recent decades. As a
result, the number of statutory enactments (and in some cases the
poor quality of their drafting) would defeat their very purpose, as
no one, not even the average educated citizen, could easily access
their contents. Quite on the contrary, Africa would follow the
most recent trends in the Northern Hemisphere, which are
characterized by a more or less radical pluralism and by mediating
procedures that emerged partly as a reaction against the suffocation
of the law by legislation. Finally, such attitude would be the only
one that respects the huge diversity of the African continent and
each of its component States.
A problem that all legislators face, but which is particularly
acute in Africa, is conveying in an adequate way the State's will to
the populations when they need to be informed about the contents
of the law. In Africa, the matter is further complicated by statutes
that are drafted mostly (if not exclusively) in a European legal
language when a considerable part of the population is either
illiterate or has absolutely no knowledge of that foreign language.
In these circumstances, how can the citizen appropriately respect
the law as made by the State? Since the early 1970s, I have been
pleading for the use of alternate means of publicizing the law in
Africa: the "translation" of the contents of official gazettes into
plain language proclamations in public, songs, theatre plays,
cartoons, movies, and so on. These were, in my view, the only
ways of ensuring that legislation was absorbed by those to whom it
applied. Needless to say, I have been preaching in the desert.
In my view, things are even worse when the population at large
is invited to participate in the law making process by approving
(oddly enough it rarely-if ever--disapproves) not any statute but
the fundamental law of the land in the form of a constitution. This
is all a sham of a democracy as the voters do not understand a
word of what they are told to approve. The draft is rarely-if
ever-translated into the many vernacular languages (or at least in
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one) of a country. This was contemplated some years ago in the
Congo 33 when the Sovereign National Conference, presided by
Manager Monsengwo, decided to translate its constitution into the
four national languages of the country: Kikongo, Lingala, Swahili,
and Tshiluba. Of course this was an impossible task if the text was
not put into a simpler vocabulary because these four languages did
not have equivalents to constitutional concepts, such as
sovereignty, parliament, or jurisdiction. I did the work in French,
but, to the best of my knowledge, it was never translated into any
of the four languages considered. It is highly doubtful that such an
attempt would have been successful. Having done it purely for the
sake of the challenge, I at least have no qualms about a possible
unjust enrichment on my part.
In conclusion, the place I would keep for the green in my own
African kaleidoscope would be limited and well-defined.
B. The Parameterof the Highly Socially-Oriented Way of Life of
Africans
At this stage, a fundamental decision should be made as to
where to place the fundamental principles that are presently
incorporated in bills, charters, or declarations of rights. Up to now,
these have been conceived by America or Europe and introduced
by various means into Africa. Yet it is not necessarily convincing
that they match the conceptions of law on the continent (or in other
countries with similar approaches to law).34 The necessity to some
of these exogenous principles in order to justify, e.g., financial or
technical assistance is remindful of the civilization paradigm of the
colonial period. This is not a plea against such principles, but
simply raises the question of whether or not there is validity of
globalization in that particular field of law.
When I refer to people, I assume that such a reference
encompasses more than just one person. In a most interesting
essay, Kasirer hinted that there could be a one-person-law. 35 Not
wishing to enter such a discussion here, it suffices to say that
33. I have since learned by chance that one of the former Liberian
constitutions was likewise "translated" in plain language, but I do not know if
this was for the purpose of a referendum. Both versions were, at a time,
available in the CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A.P.
Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds., 1974).

34. See CULTURE AND RIGHTS (Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Bdn~dicte Dembour

& Richard A. Wilson eds., 2001).
35. Nicholas Kasirer, Le Droit Robinsonien, in LA STRUCTURE DES
SYSTtMES JURIDIQUES [The Structure of Legal Systems] 195-230 (0. Mordteau
& J. Vanderlinden eds., 2003).
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people agree to govern temporarily or permanently (for whatever
that means) an existing relationship between them, and this
relationship may be considered the law under which their
agreement stands. What is commonly excluded from the law in the
actual setup, i.e., the gentleman's (or gentlewoman's-why not?),
agreement is that it is law and should be respected. The more so
because such agreement will, in many cases, reflect a common
sense of what is just for both parties far beyond the technicalities
required by the law on the books.
If, in that perspective, we transfer to the classical theory of the
sources of law, we meet an unknown character: the contract.
Every single civil lawyer has been trained in the view that
contracts (or, in the language of the French Civil Code article
1134, "conventions"), although they "make the law of the parties"
("font la loi des parties" in French), do not make law-and thus are
not sources of law-in the sense we have been using the
expression in this symposium. They create only subjective rights
(note the plural), not law (note the singular). This perspective has
been challenged, 36 especially since "conventions" are easily
considered sources of law if they are passed between collectivities
like trade unions and business organizations. What is good as a
collective agreement does not exist between individuals. In a
critical or radical pluralist perspective, such distinction is
inconceivable. Thus I would definitely be tempted to introduce
conventions between individuals among the sources of law.
The use of the adjective "just" in the last sentence of the
paragraph before the previous one is far from meaningless. It goes
back to the idea that necessary fairness is an essential quality of
any law. It also goes back to the concept of ustice, which
Professor Banakas has highlighted in his article, and thus to
values, which would correspond to a second color, or rather a noncolor, that of white, representing the super-eminent principles in
our kaleidoscope. These principles play a fundamental role in
legal change-many would say in legal fluctuations-today. They
are necessarily vague concepts that require an interpretation by the
judge. These principles are embedded in constitutional enactments
of such importance that they are no longer "amendments," like in
the U.S. Constitution, but rather are like a "charter." Yet one
36. See Jean-Pascal Chazal, De la signification du mot loi dans l'Article
1134 Alina Ier du Code civil, 100 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 265

(2001).
37. Stathis Banakas, A Global Concept of Justice--Dreamor Nightmare?
Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or Righteousness Competing in
Today's World, 67 LA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).
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would not consider them as case-law because the judge is not
supposed to "make" the principle but only to specify its field of
application.
Jestaz calls these general principles "a mysterious
38
entity."
When considering law making in Africa, it is important to
understand that the general principles deal more with adjective
problems (law as a process) than -with substantive ones (law as a
catalogue of solutions). The main super-eminent value may be the
necessity of harmony within society. The consequences that flow
from this fundamental principle include, among many: (1) reestablishing broken harmony, which requires a collective process
in order to reach the deepest truth about the reason the breach
occurred; (2) the collective process that takes time as it involves an
in-depth exploration of everything that is relevant to reach a
satisfying truth-exposure that not all involved parties will be
ready or able to face; (3) once a satisfying truth is reached, another
delay will result from the collective construction of a satisfying
way of mending the unraveled seamless web of social life. These
consequences will lead, finally, to reconciliation. This is not
"African" justice as "administered" for decades by colonial
administrators, who visited and controlled "native" courts and
eventually adjudicated ten or more cases a day. It also is not
national (i.e., global) justice as dispensed in the following decades
by post- (which is preferable, but identical in this case, to neo-)
colonial justice.
Assuming that, in a pluralist perspective, people will be
confronted, as they are today, with their own ways to settle their
differences and that of the State (that they are prone to desert
currently), State judges will necessarily be part of the picture, even
if it is only to administer the parts of State law that will still be
operational. But, insofar as they are confronted with the main bulk
of the population, they would have to be of a kind other than the
current one. This last consideration brings into the picture the
necessity to mentally decolonize the mind of so many lawyers in
Africa through a re-appropriation of the roots they share with the
majority of their compatriots. Truth and reconciliation is also on
the agenda in this instance. Such mental decolonization should
also pass-at least for the upcoming generations of judgesthrough a fundamental reassessment of their current education,
which is still closely modeled on exogenous programs of teaching.

38. Phillipe Jestaz, Source ddlicieuse, 92
CIVIL 73, 76 (1993).
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Whatever organization of the curriculum one adopts, 39 it seems
that an indirect, but more importantly a direct contact with justice,
as perceived and attained by the populations, will have to be
included in the curriculum.40 As for the existing judges, why not
organize for them, mutatis mutandis, the same kind of direct
contact with the law as practiced by the populations and as
Hesseling organized for law professors in Mali. 4 1
Everyone knows how great knowledge can be as a tool of
power. Everyone knows that those who recognize the importance
of this tool 42 play an important role in the law making process.
Even if legal theories about the sources of law are prone to
diminish, if not deny, their role as law producers, the latter is often
4 3 is indeed
determinant in the background. The Professorenrecht
far from being confined to the walls of law faculties, but there is no
need to elaborate on this point. In African tradition, the role of
knowing elders has so often been mentioned that it is obvious. In a
pluralist non-hierarchical view of the sources of law, it has to be
brought into the picture.
Last, but not least, in our kaleidoscope comes the blue of
custom. What is it made of? Custom in general is essentially the
perception of a way to behave and, as a source of law, a common
perception of how to behave in accordance with the other members
of society. Custom is typically expressed in most of Africa by the
answer: "We always have been doing so." There is accordingly no
reference to revelation (the law as expressed in the word of God),
legislation (the law as expressed by the ruler), case law (the law as
expressed by the restorer of harmony or the adjudicator), the
convention (the law as expressed in the agreement with the other
party), or legal knowledge (the law as expressed by the learned).
Custom is not word or writing; it is gesture. As soon as it is either
word or writing, it ceases to be custom as directly perceived by the
individual. This is why (although, in a distant past, I have
39. The American and Canadian curriculums, with the exception of Quebec,
require a bachelor's degree before acceding to law; the European curriculum has
no such requirement.
40. For an example of such an approach, see Jacques Vanderlinden,
Enseigner sans reproduire-Rnoversans tout d~truire: Propos hdtdrodoxes au
depart de quelques constats 6lkmentaires, in LES DEFIS DES DROITS
FONDAMENTAUX 423 (J.Y. Morin & G. Otis eds., 2000).
41. See Hesseling et al., supra note 20.
42. This category is not restricted to law professors; it includes experts of
all kinds but also all sorts of individuals or organizations contributing to the
dissemination of law on the basis of the assumption that "they know better."
43. For example, in the context of German legal history, the "professors'
law," which was developed in the law faculties during the second half of the
nineteenth century.
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succumbed to the temptation. of writing it down under various
forms) I object to the drafting of custom. Such drafting too often
results in a static image to which one clings while behaviors
change. The result is even worse if the written-down custom
receives some kind of official status.
In the course of the last few decades, African customs have
changed and proven their capacity for adaptation to new
circumstances. The most striking example-as mentioned earlier
in this article-is the case of urban customs: Some people follow
urban customs for parts of their daily lives, while behaving
according to their rural custom for other parts. The image seen
when the kaleidoscope is turned to view their different customary
selves can be very different depending on the particular situation.
The worst thing one could do in such evolving situations would be
to globalize them into a well-defined status, like it was done in the
past in civil law colonial territories. The colonial territories were,
in that respect, quite different from the common law regions where
the courts focused on each situation with all its peculiarities and
decided which law (customary, religious, or State) provided the
best answer to the case in accordance with what the parties
expected from their transaction.
The last component of the highly socially-oriented way of life
of the Africans is religion. This component, though the last
discussed, is certainly not of least importance, especially since it
has a direct bearing on law making. Though Africans had a rich
and diverse array of founding myths explaining the origin of the
universe and, of course, of men as they currently are, African
societies also had religions, which, in their ilobalizing, "civilizing"
fad, the Europeans called superstitions.
But the task of
disseminating "civilization" was mostly entrusted to Christian
missions through education at all levels; this was evidently
accompanied by the propagation that theirs was the only possible
faith, in the same way that, centuries before Europeans scrambled
for Africa, Muslim influence was established on the northern part
of the continent through the Sahara and down roughly to the tenth
parallel. This Muslim influence resulted in many Africans
converting to Islam. Consequently, with reference to monotheist
religions of the Book, Africa is certainly the continent with the
largest number of religious-minded persons.
But as the colonizing powers of the twentieth century more or
less respected these creeds and even in some places gave them a
privileged place in the colonial setup, they were not able to fully
44. They never realized how many of their own religious beliefs could be so
qualified.
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repress all the cults that proliferated in many places. These cults
developed after independence. For some of them, they still
represented an organized stable structure in the general disarray of
economic, political, and social crises. For others, they represented
the promise of ultimate justice, if not in this world, at least possibly
in the next one. On top of these institutional trends, all sorts of
individual "preachers" appeared who derived a direct benefit from
the Africans' need for some hope in their current misery.
From the time of colonization onwards, constituted "churches"
have made up powerful pressure groups on governments, and this
is still true today. Their pressure includes, as in other parts of the
world, clear manifestations of what they want the law to be. Such
action is the more important as it often concentrates on family
relations, which are the most current legal relations for the
majority of the population. The role played by the churches is also
the more important as some of them are particularly strict and
determined as to their role in the governance of the everyday life of
Africans, even if their stand is radically opposed to some features
of African marriage that are in direct conflict with their beliefs;
such is the case with monogamy, which is fundamental in the eyes
of most churches. For these churches, there is often no question of
legal pluralism in Africa, even if they cannot avoid it in other parts
of the world.45 This does not mean that tensions do not exist in the
current legal life of Africans, especially in family and successions
issues between official, canon, or customary law. These tensions
have to be taken into account when contemplating the African
legal landscape. Religion and God's law are definitely part of the
highly socially-oriented African way of life.
C. The Parameterof the Aspiration to Know the Law
If it had not been for the aping or the innocent belief that the
minute you had a code not only did the law change on the.books,
but also in the lives of the citizens, then the supporters of
codification in Africa could have been convinced that it was useful
insofar as Bentham's famous phrase expressed an evident truth,
which it does not. Bentham's phrase reads as follows: "The
principle of justice is, that law should be known by all and, for its

45. See Jacques Vanderlinden, Une lecture du systbme normatif de I'tglise
catholique par un pluraliste comparatiste aux personnalits multiples, 50
McGill L.J. 809 (2005).
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being known, codification is -absolutely essential. 4 6 If one can
easily believe, on the basis of reasonably strong evidence, that the
will to improve the knowledge of the law is a leading factor behind
codification,47 then experience shows that such will is more
wishful thinking than fact; far more than reality, it represents a
quest for perfection in the expression of law for the completion of
which no Galaad 48 has yet been found.
In Africa, the problem of a perfect knowledge of the law by the
populations arises the less as, for a long time and today, for many
people, the law is still formulated through custom. The best
possible knowledge of law available to all members of a given
society can only be realized through that specific source of law.
From the very beginning of a person's existence, custom is
embedded in his life and its knowledge grows with age and
intermingling with the group's cultural, economic, political, and
social behavior.
The introduction of writing and formal education by the
colonizer has altered this perspective of custom. The active
transfer of law through custom has been challenged by an oral
transfer of legislation, case law, or legal science; but the latter has
unfortunately (or fortunately as some would say) proven quite
ineffective for various reasons. Among the reasons for the
ineffectiveness is the fact that legislation, case law, and legal
science were nearly always formulated in a doubly foreign
language, that of the law and that of the colonizer. I have dealt
with this problem before and would like to mention one of its
facets pertaining more specifically to custom, i.e., the problem of
writing it down in order to have it better known. There was a
strong movement in that direction in the late 1950s to early
1960s, 49 as well as in British, French, and Belgian Africa.
It took me nearly thirty years to realize how wrong I was in
advocating the drafting of Congolese customs. 50 The minute you
write down your impression of what custom is, you kill it. It loses
46.

10 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 581 (John Bowring ed., 1843).

See also Jacques Vanderlinden, Code et codification dans la pens~e de Jeremy
Bentham, 3 TuDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 4 (1964).
47. See Jacques Vanderlinden, LE CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE
OCCIDENTALE DU XIIIE AU XIXE SIECLES (1967).
48. In Germanic mythological tradition, Galaad is the brave and pure knight
of the Round Table who is the first to be allowed to contemplate the Holy Grail.
49. See Jacques Vanderlinden, Vers la r~daction des droits coutumiers
congolais, in LA REDACTION DES COUTUMES DANS LE PASSE ET LE PRESENT 233
(J. Gilissen ed., 1962). See also Jacques Vanderlinden, COUTUMIER, MANUEL
ET JURISPRUDENCE DE DROIT ZANDE (1969).
50. Le juriste et la coutume, un couple impossible?, in ACTES DU
CINQUANTENAIRE DU CEMUBAC

249-50 (1988).
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its essential character, which is the idea that custom is constantly
changing in accordance with people's behavior. You may have
made an excellent photograph of it, but there are the following
problems: (1) it comes out of your personal prism with all the
distortions it is likely to produce; and (2) it is a static view that is
rapidly outdated. As for the argument that the drafting increases
the knowledge of custom, it must be qualified as it is far too
absolute. In fact, the drafting or codification of custom does not
concern the people most interested-they know their custom as
they live it and constantly adjust it to their changing
environment-but only the civil servants or "learned" judges who
are challenged by their ignorance of it and cannot accept appearing
more ignorant than the ones .they rule. This is true in Africa as it
was true in England in the early fourteenth century when justices
were attempting to draft the customs of Kent and were met with an
evasive answer.51 Let people make their law collectively through
their daily behavior. This is what they consider the law to be, and
it is their belief that should matter if one pays more than lip service
to critical or radical pluralism.
D. The Parameterof the Absolute Needfor Africa to Play a Part
in the Global World
In his opening seminal contribution to our symposium,
Banakas convincingly demonstrated that one cannot do much
against the kind of global world the capital needs to satisfy its
ever-growing "natural" and irrepressible development. Yet he also
indicated that lawyers were among those who could contribute to
the alleviation of the impact of globalization on populations. If
one accepts these premises, African lawyers (and possibly lawyers
interested in Africa's future) have to play a role in the building of
the defenses law can eventually use to try to oppose to the havoc
brought by wild capitalism to the cultures, economies, political
institutions and social fabrics of the continent. Africans and their
friends all over the world also have to develop their abilities in
mastering the legal tools used in globalization and turn them
against their formidable opponent.
This will essentially operate at the State level through the
making of a law that will be totally different from the one
described in the preceding pages of this article. Such is the sacred
trust States should exercise on behalf of their populations.
Unfortunately, this is not the case and, in the past fifty years, the
51. 5 THE EvRE OF KENT OF 6 AND 7 EDWARD 11 (1313-1314) 50 (F.W.
Maitland, L.W. Vernon Harcourt & W.C. Bolland eds., 1909).
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ruling "elites" have been more prone to plunder the common
wealth than to be concerned with the welfare and future of their
fellow citizens. There is no need to elaborate here on the overall
corruption that plagues African States. Having been privileged to
run the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Congolese
capital in the first years of the Congolese independence, I have
been a direct witness of how rapidly corruption infiltrated the local
economy. This corruption is primarily the result of the influence
of foreigners trying desperately either to pump their earnings out of
the country or to gain new market shares in the few "juicy" sectors
of economy that were still active. Africans, especially those in
power at the top of the State, were quickly exposed to temptations
to uniquely foster their own interests and to completely forget the
population entrusted to their care. The population was abandoned,
and it was these people who carried the brunt of the destruction of
the local economy. This destruction, in turn, led to another kind of
generalized, small-size, and lower level corruption that was closely
linked to the need of thousands of people to survive. These people
held some kind of negotiable power allowing them to compensate
for unpaid salaries, the increasing cost of living, and monetary
collapse.
If one wishes to start on a new basis someday, then action from
the State will be needed. And, if such action can be obviously
directed to the internal part of each country, then it necessarily also
has to take into consideration the predominant role of outside
influences on the country, whether those influences include capital,
other States who can contribute in the building of a new approach
to development, or international organizations where the role of
these outside influences seems predominant.
Even if such
perspectives are far from encouraging, occasional signs are
encouraging because those experiences show that there are ways to
escape Africa's woes other than through globalization.
Unfortunately, not much is currently being done in the legal
field. Yet a brief word needs to be said about the OHADA
(Organisation pour l'harmonisation africaine du droit des
affaires--Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in
Africa) as I have been somewhat critical about that institution in
other writings.52 I still do not believe, as some extollers of the
organization, that the creation of OHADA, along with the huge
resources at its disposal, 53 will bring an end to unemployment in
52. See Jacques Vanderlinden, Quo Vaditis Iura Africana?, 8
FOR AFRIKANISCHES RECHT

JAHRBUCH

145 (1997).

53. See Ohada, Le Portail du Droit des
http://www.ohada.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
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West Africa, the region most concerned by OHADA's activities. I
also have some reservations about the amount of money spent on
what is a fairly small clientele-that of upper-level, economic, and
preferably international operators-while no one seems to care
about the state of justice for the overwhelming majority of the
population. But I cannot deny that the organization, with its
sophisticated structures, specialized schools or institutes,
conferences, publications, and clubs, may be precisely the kind of
tool needed to fight globalization. Yet I also fear-although I have
no direct independent information on that point-that OHADA's
action could be fully and discreetly recuperated by the capital
(precise information about its finances would be interesting in that
respect) and by international institutions that are definitely engaged
in the globalizing process. The OHADA website hints in this
direction when it says that OHADA exists "thanks to the support
and direct involvement of the private sector and of international
corporations," and that "given the great progress OHADA
represents for the African economies and the high stakes of
OHADA's success, [it] . . .quickly gathered nearly 100 major
corporations dedicated to OHADA's dissemination and success. ' 54
Such statements do not alleviate my fears, even if OHADA has
enthusiastically been supported by someone I know personallyKeba Mbaye.
This man chaired the International African Law
Association and was a former President of the Senegalese Supreme
Court and Constitutional Court, and a Judge at the International
Court of Justice. Rarely in my life have I met a man of so many
exceptional qualities and integrity, and working closely with him
was a unique privilege. Obviously, he supported the unification of
African positive laws, but I have difficulty believing that he was
indifferent to the misery that globalization and capital, so heavily
present in OHADA, could bring to African countries. I only hope
that, one day, I will be able to fully appreciate the positive role that
OHADA's policies and acts have played in fostering the absolute
need for Africa to play a part in the global world in order to
diminish, through law, the current unfortunate results of
globalization for the average African.

54. Id.
55. He died on January 11, 2007.
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CONCLUSION

What precedes only conveys half a century of occasional notes5 6
queries, and, first and foremost, perplexities about law in Africa.
As I am writing this article in the environment of a "global" world,
I feel terribly outdated and look, more than anything else, like a
relic from a distant past rowing desperately against the tide.
Reaching slowly the term of a busy active life, the latter has taught
me that the more those around me believe that I have managed to
know something, the more I know that I know nothing. What is
more, such embryo of knowledge-whether expressed orally or in
writing-is constantly subjected to doubts of all kinds and
magnitude. This is particularly true of what I could appear to
know about Africa. But I try to keep intact my passion for the
Dark Continent; slightly adapting to my own situation Unamuno's
well-known dictum: "Life is doubt, doubt without passion is
death., 57 These doubts appeared while I was in my third year of
law school (law school for me was a total of five years). I had then
been taught for slightly more than two years that law-like the
Catholic Church, which embraced ninety percent of my fellow
Belgian countrymen-was "one, holy, universal" (unum, sanctum,
catholicum). Simultaneously, I realized, through personal research
about codification, that the stele of Hammurabi 58 and the Joei
Shiki-Moku 59 had much less in common with what I had been told
and instructed to repeat at the exam if I was ever questioned about
"what is a code." Ever since, doubts about words--especially
those short three letters, one which is my professional toy-and the
nature of things they try to describe has inhabited me. Could I,
under such circumstances, end up being anything but a radical
pluralist inhabited by doubt? Make mine-although with minimal
changes-the final words attributed to Joan of Arc by George
Bernard Shaw: "0 God that madest this beautiful world of African
laws, when will it be ready to receive
many more pluralist
60
lawyers? How long, 0 Lord, how long?,
56. My first article and my first book published shortly after graduation
were devoted to African laws. My most recent article to be published soon in
Paris deals with legal pluralism.
57. Unamuno indeed wrote: "Life is doubt, and faith without doubt is only
death" in his SALMO II, POESIAS (1907) as published in his 16 OBRAS
COMPLETAS 287 (1958).
58. I tried desperately through a careful reading of editions of the text in
English, French, and German to find out what kind of "code" it was.
59. As published in the Transactionsof the Asiatic Society of Japan, where
it was called-as it still is in the Encyclopedia Britannica-a medieval "code."
60. G.B. Shaw, SAINT JOAN 163 (1932).

